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Abstract of 'Is Representation Rife?':
This paper applies a teleosemantic perspective to the question of whether there is 
genuine representation outside the familar realm of belief-desire psychology.  I first 
explain how teleosemantics accounts for the representational powers of beliefs and 
desires themselves.  I then ask whether biological states which are simpler than belief 
and desires can also have representational powers.  My conclusion is that such 
biologically simple states can be ascribed representational contents, but only in a 
system-relative way:  such states must be ascribed varying contents when viewed as 
components in different biological systems.  I conclude by arguing that 'the genetic 
code' does not even embody this kind of system-relative representation.
Is Representation Rife?
1.  Introduction  How many representations are there?  How many items have the 
mysterious power of standing for some other state of affairs, and thereby portraying 
the world as being a certain way?
Indicative sentence tokens are certainly representations.  When I utter the words 'Tony 
Blair is in Manchester', I represent Tony Blair as being in Manchester.  My utterance 
is false if this state of affairs does not obtain. 
If human beings have causally significant states corresponding to the beliefs of 
everyday psychology1[1], then those states too are representations.  When I believe that 
Tony Blair is in Manchester, my belief 2[2] represents Tony Blair as being in 
Manchester.  My belief is false if this state of affairs does not obtain.
Perhaps some other sentences, and some other everyday psychological states, are also 
representations.  Thus, imperative sentences might be viewed as representing the 
actions that would fulfil them.  And desires might be viewed as representing the states 
of affairs that would satisfy them.
But are there more representations than these?  Are there representations outside the 
familiar realms of public languages and everyday psychology?  It is common enough 
to find people talking as if there were.  Vision scientists will refer to cells in the 
cortical area V1 as 'edge detectors'.  Geneticists talk of DNA as embodying a 'genetic 
                                                
1[1]   There may be no such causally significant states, in which case everyday psychology should at 
best be read interpretationally, as characterizing the way people interact with their environment, but 
with no implications about psychological mechanisms.  This position is variously defended by Donald 
Davidson, Daniel Dennett, and some contemporary enthusiasts for embodied cognition.  In what 
follows I shall assume that this interpretationalist stance is wrong, and that there are indeed causally 
significant states corresponding to the categories of everyday psychology.  This is largely for 
expository simplicity, however, and not because I am a convinced realist about everyday psychology.  
My current concern is with the representational powers which beliefs and desires would possess if they 
were real, and not with the truth of this antecedent.  But it would be tiresome to conduct the whole 
discussion in conditional form. 
2[2]  I want to think of representers as 'syntactic' items, which have their representational contents 
inessentially.  Given this, it is loose talk to speak of  'beliefs' as representers, since we think of beliefs 
(types or tokens) as having their contents essentially.  However, we have no familiar word for the 
putative causally significant states which stand to belief contents as sentences stand to their contents, so 
I shall continue to talk loosely in what follows. 
code'.  Endocrinologists talk about 'chemical messengers' in the bloodstream.  
Examples can easily be multiplied. 
How seriously should we take these ascriptions of representational powers to 
biological items other than sentences and psychological states?  Is such talk simply a 
vague metaphor?  Or do these simple biological items represent in a full-blooded 
sense?
In what follows I shall address these questions from a teleosemantic perspective.  In 
general terms, the teleosemantic approach views representation as a matter of 
biological design.  Representations are states that contribute to the biological design 
of certain larger systems in certain ways.
Given this generally biological approach to representation, you might expect me to 
conclude that representation is rife throughout the biological realm.  But this would be 
too quick.  I have doubts about the propriety of applying representational talk outside 
the paradigm areas of language and everyday psychology.
In what follows I shall proceed by first explaining how the teleosemantic approach 
analyses the representational powers of beliefs and desires.3[3]  This will turn out to 
hinge on various specific features of belief-desire psychology, features which are not 
displayed by all the simple biological systems to which representational powers are 
colloquially ascribed.  I shall argue that when these features are absent it is a moot 
point whether representational terminology is appropriate.  Of course, everybody is 
free to use terms as they wish, and I am not suggesting that any ban be imposed on 
talk of 'chemical messengers' and the like.  But at the same time it is important to be 
clear about the significance of such terminology, and in particular about how far these 
simpler examples display the features found in paradigm cases of representation.
2.  Teleosemantics and Belief-Desire Psychology.  When I first started to think about 
representation in teleological terms, my concern was not to understand biological 
systems in general, but belief-desire psychology in particular.4[4]  My starting point 
was the functionalist picture of beliefs and desires that was common coin among 
naturalistically inclined philosophers in the 1970s.  This functionalist picture threw up 
a problem about representation, at least to the extent that it didn't seem use of any 
representational notions.
Too see the problem, recall how functionalism viewed beliefs and desires as causal 
intermediaries between perception and behaviour, as internal states with characteristic 
perceptual causes and behavioural effects.  On this view, the representational aspects 
of beliefs and desires seem to play no role.  The nature of beliefs and desires is 
exhausted by the way they interact causally with perceptions, behaviour, and each 
                                                
3[3]  Let me assume from now on that beliefs and desires are representationally fundamental, and that 
the representational powers of sentences derive from the representational powers of the beliefs and 
desires they express.   If there are no causally significant beliefs and desires, then this assumption will 
of course need rethinking.
4[4]  By contrast, Ruth Millikan was always interested in the full range of biological possibilities, and 
helpfully discusses simpler biological representational systems in her Language, Thought and Other 
Biological Categories (1984).  I take what follows to be consistent with her views, even though she has 
not always been fully explicit about the issues of indeterminacy on which I focus in what follows.
other.  Relative to these causal roles, it seems irrelevant that a given belief might 
represent some such distal fact as that Lima is the capital of Peru, or a desire might 
represent the distal aim that I go to Lima, .  The internal causal roles of beliefs and 
desires seem to be independent of these putative external representational relations.  
(For the classic statement of this worry, see Field, 1978.)
Nor does it help to allow the functionalist causal roles to extend outside the head.  At 
first pass, you might think you could reinstate representational relations, if only the 
functionalist causal roles were allowed to include the distal causes of beliefs, and not 
just their perceptual causes, and the distal effects of desires, and not just their 
behavioural effects.  (Thus the capital status of Lima might feature among the causes 
of the above belief, and my going to Lima among the effects of the above desire.)  But 
this thought falls foul of 'disjunctivism' (cf. Fodor, 1990, pp. 63ff.)  Beliefs have 
characteristic causes other than their truth conditions, and desires have characteristic 
effects other than their satisfaction conditions (otherwise there would be no false 
beliefs and no unsatisfied desires).   So, if we really followed through the equation of 
representational contents with characteristic causes and effects, then we would end up, 
absurdly, taking any given belief to represent the disjunction of its truth condition or
those deceptive circumstances which induce false instances of the belief, and any 
given desire to represent the disjunction of its satisfaction condition or the effects it 
produces when frustrated. 
This is where it originally seemed to me that some biological teleology could help 
(Papineau, 1984, 1987).  My idea was to focus, not on the actual causes and effects of 
beliefs and desires, but on those they are biologically designed to have.  Then we can 
equate the satisfaction conditions of desires with those effects which they are 
biologically supposed to produce, and the truth conditions of beliefs with those causes 
with which they are biologically supposed to co-vary.5[5]
How exactly can the representational contents of beliefs and desires be derived from 
an analysis of their biological functions?  It will be worth being clear on the details of 
this, given that later on we will want to know whether representational contents can 
analogously be derived from biological functions in systems that are simpler than 
belief-desire psychology.
A first point is that biological functions are always a matter of effects.  I understand 
talk of biological functions aetiologically.  To say that some trait T has the function F 
is to say that T is now present because previous versions of T produced the effect F, 
and in consequence was favoured by natural selection.
Given this, an analysis of the biological functions of the components in a belief-desire 
system must start with the functions of desires.  Beliefs have no effects to call their 
own:  there is no specific result that the belief that grass is green, say, is designed to 
produce.  By contrast, the biological purpose of any given desire is to produce some
specific result:  my desire for ice-cream, for example, has the specific biological 
                                                
5[5]  Note that these claims are intended as a posteriori metaphysical reductions, not as conceptual truths.  
Proper attention to this point yields a natural response to the objection that a 'swampman' without any 
biological design would still have representational states.  (For details, see Papineau, 2001.) 
purpose of causing me to ingest ice-cream.6[6]  In line with this, we can analyse the 
satisfaction condition for any desire as that specific effect it is biologically designed 
to bring about.
Beliefs are different.  As I said, they have no effects to call their own.  Rather, their 
purpose is to gear behaviour to circumstances.  The job of any given belief is to 
prompt actions which will succeed in satisfying currently active desires if such-and-
such circumstances obtain. In line with this, we can analyse the truth condition of a 
belief as that condition under which the actions it prompts will satisfy the desires it is 
acting in concert with. 
Note how this story makes the content of beliefs a 'output-orientated' matter.  The 
dominant tendency within modern philosophy is think of belief contents in a 'input-
orientated' way, that is, to equate truth conditions with the characteristic causes of 
beliefs.  The teleosemantic approach reverses this picture.7[7]  The content of beliefs is 
tied to how they make us behave, not to the circumstances which cause them.  If you 
behave in a way which is apt to satisfy your desires if p, then this shows that you 
believe p, whatever the characteristic causes of your belief.  If you go to the fridge 
when you desire ice-cream, then this shows that you believe that there is now ice-
cream in the fridge, even if you are characteristically forgetful, say, and your belief is 
caused by old fridge contents rather than up-to-date ones.  What matters is that your 
behaviour shows that you are taking there to be ice-cream in the fridge, so to speak, 
not the characteristic causes of your belief.8[8]
3.  The Threat of Indeterminacy.  The interlocking functions of beliefs and desires 
play a crucial role in allowing teleosemantics to ascribe determinate contents to these 
states.  To see this, consider Jerry Fodor's complaint that teleosemantics is unable to 
explain the determinacy of content (1990, ch. 3).  Fodor's central example is the 
putative state in the frog's brain which prompts it to snap its tongue in the direction of 
passing flies.  Fodor challenges teleosemanticists to explain why this state should be 
regarded as representing flies, rather than small, black, moving things.  After all, 
Fodor observes, we could as well take the frog's visual system to be biologically 
                                                
6[6]  It should not be thought that every item with an aetiological function must be 'innate'.  A desire for 
ice-cream, for example, can have a 'derived function' in Millikan's sense, or a function consequent on 
ontogenetic rather than phylogenetic selection.
7[7]  Not that the output-orientated approach to belief content is peculiar to teleosemantics.  The output-
orientated approach hinges on the claim that the truth condition of a belief is the condition under which 
the actions it prompts will satisfy the desires it is acting in concert with.  This claim doesn't itself say 
anything about how to analyse satisfaction conditions for desires, and so is available to anyone who has 
some prior account of desire satisfaction.  (Cf. the 'success semantics' of Ramsey, 1927, Appiah, 1986, 
Mellor, 1988, Whyte, 1990.)  There are also theories which don't prioritize satisfaction over truth 
conditions, but still view the above claim as a constraint on the joint ascription of truth and satisfaction 
conditions—such theories will be 'bi-directional' rather than output-orientated.  (Cf.  Stalnaker, 1984.)  
For my reasons for preferring teleosemantics to success semantics, see Papineau, 1993, sect. 3.8; for a 
reason for preferring teleosemantics to bi-directional theories, see Papineau, 2001, sect. VIII.
8[8]  Looked at intuitively, a 'output-orientated' approach to belief content is surely more natural than the 
philosophically more familiar 'input-orientated' alternatives.  Given that humans have many predictable 
tendencies to doxastic error, we surely want a theory of content that allows that there can be systematic 
causes for false belief, not a theory which equates systematic causes with truth conditions.  If you ask 
me, the only reason input-orientated approaches to representation are so prevalent within philosophy is 
their association with the forlorn verificationist programme of blocking scepticism by arguing that false 
belief is impossible.
designed to respond to small, black moving things as to respond to flies.  A healthy 
frog will snap its tongue whenever it is presented with a small black moving thing, 
whether or not it is a fly.
An initial answer to Fodor is to note that teleosemantics deals in functions, and that 
functions are always a matter of effects, as observed above.  If we simply focus on the 
possible causes of a belief-like state, there will inevitably be a number of alternative 
conditions with which the occurrence of the state is correlated (fly versus small, black 
moving thing), and there will be no obvious basis for deciding between these 
alternatives as the content of the state.  But we will do better if we look at the way the 
state is designed to contribute to advantageous effects.  For example, the frog's state 
surely has the function of helping the frog catch flies, rather than small black things:  
no selective advantage accrues to a frog that grabs some non-nutritious speck of 
passing dirt.  In line with this, teleosemantics can argue that the frog's brain state 
represents flies, rather than small black things.  For it is precisely when its brain state 
is prompted by a fly, rather than any small black thing, that an advantageous effect 
will accrue.  (Cf. Millikan, 1993a, chs 4 and 11;  Millikan, 1993b.) 
However, it is not clear this response fully deals with Fodor's frog worry.  I just said 
that the advantageous result to which the frog's state contributes is catching flies, 
rather than small black things.  No reproductive advantage accrues when it catches a 
small black thing which isn't a fly.  But why stop there?  The biological point of 
catching flies is to get them into the stomach.  No reproductive advantage accrues if a 
fly is caught, but it isn't ingested.  Again, the biological point of ingesting something 
into the stomach is to get nutrients into the bloodstream.  No reproductive advantage 
accrues if a fly is ingested but it yields no nutrients into the bloodstream.  And so on.  
In the end, the ultimate point of all functional traits is to produce viable offspring.  No 
reproductive advantage ensues from any intermediate effects if they don't eventuate in 
offspring.
Given all this, it seems arbitrary to interpret the frog's state as representing flies.  Why 
not read it as representing stomach-filler?  Or as nutrient source?  Or even as 
reproduction enhancer?
Let us put the frog's state to one side for a while.  It may indeed be tricky to ascribe a 
determinate content to this state.  However, the same difficultly does not apply when 
we look at the components in a genuine system of belief-desire psychology, where 
desires set the goals, and the task of beliefs is then to provide information about the 
best means to those goals.
This is because the desires in such a psychological system are specifically focused on 
one given result, rather than some whole 'concertina' of results that will eventuate in
reproductive success.  When I desire warmth, or ice-cream, or to go to Lima, it is 
these specific results that my desires are aimed at.  Other beneficial effects may 
accrue as a consequence of my achieving these results, but this does not matter to the 
satisfaction of my desires.  The task of my desire for warmth is to keep me warm.  
Whether my being warm will eventually lead to reproductive success is a further 
matter—even if it doesn't, my desire for warmth will still have been satisfied.
Given this point about desires, we can then answer Fodor's challenge, at least for the 
components in a system of belief-desire psychology.  Given that desires are aimed at 
specific results, as just explained, we can think of the contents of beliefs as the 
conditions in which the actions they prompt will yield those specific results.  Beliefs 
represent facts that are relevant to the satisfaction of desires, not facts that matter to 
any further effects.
To see the point, imagine that, contrary to the facts, frogs did have a belief-desire 
psychology.  Then it would be a determinate matter whether the frog's behaviour was 
prompted by a desire to catch a fly, say, as opposed to the desire to ingest something, 
or a desire to have more blood nutrients, or a desire to have more offspring.  
(Compare the way in which you might specifically desire to hold an ice-cream, rather 
than to eat it, or . . .)  Moreover, if the frog's behaviour was prompted by the desire 
specifically to catch a fly, say, rather than a desire for some other result, then this 
would imply that its belief-like state represented fly over there, rather than nutrient 
source, or whatever.
(Why are desires biologically designed to aim for outcomes other than reproductive 
success?  After all, the ultimate end of selective design is always reproductive success.  
Given this, why do we have desires for more immediate ends, like food, or warmth, or 
sex?  Why didn't natural selection just give us a single desire for reproductive success, 
and leave it to us to figure out how best to achieve it?  The answer, of course, is that 
best means to reproductive success in any given circumstance isn't always easy to 
figure out.  Even if we modern humans can sometimes manage this, most of our 
evolutionary ancestors couldn't.  So natural selection instead set our ancestors some 
more easy goals, like food, warmth and sex, goals which in the evolutionary past 
correlated reasonably well with reproductive success, yet which were immediate 
enough for our ancestors to figure out effectively how to achieve them.)
4.  Neander and Desires.  Given that desires are aimed at specific results, rather than 
whole sequences, we have an effective answer to Fodor's indeterminacy challenge 
within the context of belief-desire psychology.  But some readers may be wondering 
whether teleosemantics is entitled to give this answer.  In truth, desires are indeed 
aimed at specific results.  But does the teleosemantic perspective have the resources to 
explain this?
Teleosemantics equates the satisfaction conditions of desires with their functions, the 
effects they are designed to produce.  The difficulty for teleosemantics is that, when it 
comes to such functional effects, as opposed to satisfaction conditions, there would 
still seem to be too many candidates.  Desires may have one satisfaction condition, 
but they still have a whole 'concertina' of functions.  Given this, the teleosemantic 
equation of satisfaction conditions with functions seems to be in trouble. 
To illustrate the problem, consider the desire for sex.  Humans often specifically 
desire sexual activity, as opposed to conception, or offspring.  However, if we think of 
this desire from a functional point of view, it surely has the function, not only of 
leading to sexual activity, but also to conception, and thence to viable offspring.  
After all, there is no selective advantage to sexual activity which does not also have 
these further effects, so these further effects should also count as functions of the 
desire for sex, if sexual activity itself does.  But then how can teleosemantics, which 
equates satisfaction conditions with functions, privilege sexual activity as the effect 
that the desire for sex is designed to produce?
Here I think that we need to borrow an idea of Karen Neander's (1995).  This offers a 
general way of distinguishing, among the 'concertina' of functional effects which 
attach to any functional trait, one specific function which is peculiar to that trait.  
Teleosemanticists then need to apply this strategy to desires in particular, and refine 
their theory of desire content by stipulating that the satisfaction condition of a desire 
is that function which is peculiar to it.   
Neander agrees that any trait with one biological function will indeed 
characteristically have a whole 'concertina' of them, corresponding to the whole 
sequence of effects via which it generates reproductive success when everything pans 
out designed.  But Neander argues that, even so, one of these functions will have a 
special status.  To show this, she switches her attention from the notion of 'function' to 
that of 'malfunction'.  Suppose we ask what shows that some item is malfunctioning.  
Presumably this is a matter of its failing to fulfil some of its functions.  But not all its 
functions are ones whose absence shows the item is malfunctioning.  If my lungs fail 
to send oxygen to my muscles, this mightn't be because my lungs are malfunctioning, 
even though sending oxygen to my muscles is one of my lungs' functions.  For the 
failure might be due to my heart failing to circulate the blood properly, while my 
lungs are oxygenating the blood fine.
The point is that most of the functional effects of any given biological traits will 
depend, not on that trait alone, but also on other traits.  Getting oxygen to the muscles 
is a joint production of both the heart and lungs.  So we can pick out that function 
which is peculiar to some trait as that functional effect for which that trait is directly 
responsible, that functional effect whose absence implies that this trait, rather than any 
other, is malfunctioning.  Thus oxygenating the blood is the function which is peculiar 
to the lungs, since this is the effect for which the lungs are directly responsible, the 
effect whose absence implies that the lungs are malfunctioning.9[9]
Similarly with desires.  The desire for sex, for example, has the functions, not just of 
promoting sexual activity, but also promoting conception, and healthy offspring.  But 
only the first of these is a function peculiar to the desire.  Only an absence of sexual 
activity implies that the desire is malfunctioning, in the sense of failing to play its 
specific part in our overall biological design.  A lack of conception, say, may be due 
to the desire failing to play its part in generating sexual activity;  but it could equally 
due to a failure of the reproductive organs to produce normal gametes.  So sexual 
activity is the function for which the desire is peculiarly responsible.  More generally, 
teleosemantics can analyse the satisfaction condition of any desire as that effect which 
it is the desire's peculiar function to produce. 
                                                
9[9]  How can something be the 'most immediate effect' of some trait?  Won't there always be 
intermediaries between any cause and effect?  Don't the lungs oxygenate the blood by creating pressure 
differences in the alveoli?  Here Neander appeals to Robert Cummins' style of 'functional analysis' 
(1975), which allows progressively more fine-grained decompositions of an overall system like the 
human body into its subcomponents.  Neander suggests that the function peculiar to any given trait is 
the immediate effect it produces at the lowest level of description where it appears as an unanalysed 
component in the functional analysis. 
5.  Simpler Systems.  So far I have accounted for representation in psychological 
systems in which desires are focused on specific ends and beliefs have the specific 
function of gearing behaviour to circumstances.  The next question is whether there is 
genuine representation in systems with less complexity. 
Before finally addressing this question, however, I would like to observe that my 
requirements for belief-desire psychology are not particularly high.  Thus it is no part 
of my argument that belief-desire psychology must be conscious10[10], nor that it must 
be governed by norms11[11].  Nor even do I require that beliefs and desires have the 
kind of compositional structure displayed by sentences in public languages.  A simple 
system of innate behavioural dispositions which are triggered by combinations of 
drives and sensory states would satisfy my essential requirements for belief-desire 
psychology.  Even such a simple system has drives which are focused on specific 
outcomes, and sensory states which are designed to gear behaviour to circumstances;  
this then allows the ascription of determinate contents in the way indicated above.  
(Cf. Papineau, 2003; Papineau, forthcoming).
But what of systems which do not have even this much complexity?  The frog would 
seem to be a case in point.  Modern physiological research suggests that frogs lack 
any integrated decision-making system in which belief-like states serve a range of 
different desires.  Rather, the sensory information which guides the frog's prey-
catching behaviour is not available to other systems of behavioural control.  One 
channel of sensory information guides its fly-catching behaviour, another guides its 
obstacle-avoiding behaviour, and yet another its ability to jump away from looming 
threats.  Lesions of the frog's optical system can dissociate these different abilities.  
(Milner and Goodale, 1995, sect. 1.2.2.)
The first thing to note about such a 'modular' system of behavioural control is that its 
sensory states do have effects of their own, in contrast to the belief states in a system 
of belief-desire psychology.  As we have seen, the latter states prompt different 
behaviours, depending on which desires they are acting in concert with.  But in the 
frog's modular behavioural control system, a given sensory state will always prompt 
the same behaviour, if it prompts any behaviour at all.  The sensory channel which is 
prompted by small, moving, black dots will only prompt correlated head-turning and 
tongue-snapping, not obstacle-avoidance or threat-evasion.
Given this, the relevant sensory signals can reasonably be ascribed imperative 
contents, apart from any indicative contents they may have.  Since any given signal 
will always prompt the same behaviour, it can simply be read as an imperative 
instruction to perform that behaviour.
Still, these imperative contents do not mean that the relevant signals cannot have 
indicative contents as well.  All that is required for indicative contents is that the 
signals prompt behaviours which are biologically aimed at some given end.  For then 
                                                
10[10]  Phenomenal consciousness may be associated with representation.  However, I don't see how this 
association can add anything extra to the requirements for representation, beyond requirements that can 
be stated in non-phenomenal terms.  This is because there seem to me overwhelming arguments for 
identifying phenomenal properties with non-phenomenal ones.  See Papineau, 2002, especially ch. 1. 
11[11]  In my book, any norms attaching to judgements are consequences of their representational powers, 
not preconditions of them.  See Papineau, 2003b. 
the signals prompting the behaviours can also be viewed as indicating the 
circumstances under which those behaviours will achieve that end.12[12]
In an earlier attempt at these issues ('Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy',1998), I 
argued that only the presence of desires can fix such biological ends.  But I am no 
longer sure about this.  Perhaps we can have behaviour directed at specific ends even 
in the absence of desires.  Thus why not simply apply Neander's idea once more, not 
now to the peculiar functions of putative desires, but directly to the prey-catching 
system as such?  As before, this system has a concertina of functions.  It is designed 
to catch flies, and thereby to have them swallowed, and thereby to allow digestion to 
place nutrients in the bloodstream, and thereby . . . to lead to reproductive success.  
But only the first of these is arguably the function peculiar to the prey-catching 
systems, considered as the visuomotor system which governs head-turning and 
tongue-snapping.  It is not necessarily the fault of this system if a fly is caught but 
does not end up in the stomach (because the swallowing mechanism is not working), 
or if it is placed in the stomach but not digested (because the stomach is 
malfunctioning), or so on.  So, on Neander's account, the prey-catching system has the 
peculiar function of catching flies, rather than any later effects.  And then, given this, 
we can view the sensory signals which prompt behaviour in this system as indicating 
the circumstance under which that behaviour will achieve the system's peculiar end—
that is, as indicating the presence of a fly with such-and-such a trajectory. 
Note, however, that this depends crucially on viewing the relevant signal as part of the 
prey-catching system.  And this by no means seems mandatory.  After all, why not 
regard the frog's sensory signal as part of the prey-stomaching system, or as part of 
the prey-digesting system, or so on.  For the effects occasioned by the sensory signal 
don't normally stop with the fly being caught—when everything is working as it 
should, the fly will also promptly be swallowed, and digested, and . . .
This then promises to render the content of the sensory signal indeterminate once 
more.  Each of the systems at issue—the prey-catching system, the prey-stomaching 
system, the prey-digesting system . . .—may well have a function of its own, as 
revealed by Neander's analysis.  But this won't give the sensory signal a determinate 
content, if it is not determinate which of these larger systems is informed by the signal.  
At best, the signal will have a content relative to some specification of the relevant 
larger system:  the signal will tell the prey-catching system about flies, so to speak, 
but will tell the prey-stomaching system about stomach-fillers, and the digestive 
system about nutrient sources, and so on.13[13]
                                                
12[12]  Ruth Millikan has coined the term 'pushmi-pullyu representation' for states that combine 
imperative and indicative contents.
13[13]  In 'Teleosemantics and Indeterminacy' I suggested that the frog's signal would have a determinate 
content as long as its prey-catching behaviour was sensitive to whether or not it was sated with flies.  
My thought was that this sensitivity would signify some variable drive state which could be viewed as 
a proto-desire aimed at some definite result.  But I now think that such sensitivity is beside the point.  
There are other ways of taking the frog's behaviour to be directed at ends, apart from having it 
prompted by some desire-like state, as just argued in the text.  Moreover, even if the frog's behaviour 
did have some drive-dependent sensitivity, the content of this drive would arguably itself be system-
relative, along with the purpose of the behaviour it prompts.  Determinacy of desire content requires an 
integrated system of beliefs and desires, of the kind the frog lacks.
6.  Is Representation Relative?  It seems odd for the content of a given signal to be a 
relative matter, depending on which larger system the signal is regarded as belonging 
to.  If attributions of content are to play any serious explanatory role, then shouldn't 
the contents of given states be definite?
The obvious alternative is to restrict the ascription of representational contents to 
components in systems with the structure of belief-desire psychology.  If we insist 
that only such belief-desire components count as representations, then the 
determinacy of content will be restored once more, for desire-like states are always 
aimed at specific results, and any belief-like states which serve those desires will then 
represent the circumstances in which resulting behaviours will produce those
results.14[14]
This is one way to go.  Note that, if we take this line, then it seems likely that we will 
rule out 'chemical messengers' in the bloodstream as genuine representers, along with 
'edge detectors' in V1, and other such biologically simple candidates.  Given that these 
states are not components in any belief-desire system, it seems open what larger 
systems they should count as contributing to, and therewith what information they are 
conveying to what.
On the other hand, perhaps determinacy of content is no great virtue.  Why not simply 
allow that a given state can mean different things to different systems?  Thus, the 
frog's brain state might mean fly to the prey-catching system, stomach-filler to the 
larger system which ingests the prey, and nutrient source to the get larger system 
which digests it.  Similarly, chemicals in the blood, or sets of cells in the visual cortex, 
could be read as having various different meaning in various different larger systems, 
depending on the circumstances required for the behaviour they prompt to achieve the 
functions peculiar to those systems. 
At bottom, the point of attributing representational content is to help us keep track of 
when the behaviour prompted by some representational state will give rise to certain 
distal effects.  A given belief-like state will issue in the same behaviour whether or 
not its truth condition is satisfied.  The significance of truth lies, not in what proximal 
behaviour is prompted, but in telling us when certain further effects will follow.  
Given this, it may well be reasonable to attribute various different contents to a given 
belief-like state, for we may well be interested in keeping track of when various 
different further results may follow.  But, if we are to allow such system-relative 
contents, we will do well always to be explicit about which larger system the content 
is relative to.
                                                
14[14]  Won't even the components in a belief-desire system succumb to the system-relative 
indeterminacy  of content?  For example, won't my beliefs about possible sexual partners , which might 
combine with my desires for sexual activity, come out as representations of possible co-conceivers, if 
regarded as contributing instead to a larger system designed to lead to conception?  (After all, when 
everything is working as it is supposed to, the desire for sex is only the first stage in a longer process 
which leads, via sexual activity, to conception, and onwards.)  However, this only reinforces my 
underlying point, which is that any representational states, including belief states, will become 
representationally indeterminate, once it is left open which larger systems they are embedded in.  
Different embedding systems, different contents, for all states.  If we want determinate contents, we 
need to insist that only embedding within belief-desire systems matters for the constitution of content.
7.  The 'Genetic Code'.  I would like to conclude with some brief remarks on the 
concept of 'genetic representation'.  It is a commonplace nowadays to refer to 'the 
genetic code'.  However, I have my doubts about whether this 'code' should be viewed 
as representational in any serious sense.  
As we have seen above, representation involves states which gear behaviour to 
circumstances.  Such states indicate, accurately or inaccurately, that circumstances are 
suitable for some behaviour to achieve some result.  The circumstances so indicated 
are then the content of the representation.
This structure seems to be absent from the systems by which genes build organisms.  
Genes, conceived of as sections of DNA, cause the machinery of gene expression to 
make proteins.  If things go well (which will standardly depend on many 
environmental conditions), these proteins will then give rise to various phenotypic 
features.  So the genes indeed prompt behaviours—or at least causal sequences—
which are directed towards biological ends.
However, there is nothing in this akin to the gearing of these causal sequences to 
variable environmental circumstances.  Normal genes do not indicate that, since 
circumstances are such-and-such, the way to achieve some result is to do X rather 
than Y.  They simply dictate the construction of some given protein.15[15]  Given this, 
it seems to me that genes can at best be regarded as brutely imperative 
representations—to make such-and-such a protein, or to make such-and-such a tissue, 
or whatever (depending on how large a system we regard the gene as instructing).  
However, such brute imperatives, unaccompanied by any states designed to gear 
instructions to circumstances, do not seem to me to qualify as serious representations.  
Any state with a function, any state designed to produce some effect, could be viewed 
as such an imperative.  To dignify any such state as a representation of its function 
would seem to empty the notion of  'representation' of its usefulness.
Of course, there is a rather different reason why talk of 'the genetic code' is so 
common.  This is the apparent arbitrariness of the pairing between the nucleotides 
which make up DNA and the protein-comprising amino acids whose construction 
they dictate.  However, this seems an orthogonal matter.  Arbitrariness in this sense is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for representation.
Let me explain.  Suppose we say that some functional biological item is 'arbitrary' if 
we can see that some physically different system could have ended up performing the 
same functions, if the accidents of evolutionary history had been different.  (In 
general, natural selection doesn't mind how some result is produced, as long as it does 
get produced.)
Note that not all functional items will be arbitrary in this sense.  Sometimes there is 
only one way to do something, like camouflaging yourself in the snow, say.
                                                
15[15]  What about 'facultative' (complexes of) genes, which produce different functional results in 
different environmental circumstances?  Well, the chemical signals which influence the expression of 
these genes may well represent those environmental features, but this is no reason to view the genes 
themselves as representational.
Now consider those special functional systems that do involve representation.  These 
need not all be arbitrary either.  For example, there may be only one good way to 
build a frog eye and optic tectum.  All alternative physical structures may have 
features that render them non-functional.  If we count the frog's signals as 
representations, they will thus be representations that are not arbitrary.
Conversely, we can have arbitrary functional items which are not representations.  It 
may be arbitrary, suggests Stephen Jay Gould, that we have five fingers, in that we 
owe this to nothing except the happenstantial elimination of our ancestors' differently-
digitised competitors.  But, even if Gould is right about this, the number of our fingers 
does not represent anything.
I am happy to allow that DNA embodies an 'arbitrary code', in the sense that evolution 
might have chosen other equally functional heritable mechanisms for making 
proteins16[16].  But since such arbitrariness is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
representation, this does nothing to show that genes represent anything. 
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